

C00753716

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COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

Copy for your [redacted] Survey file.

Formal response to the IG review of [redacted]
is due early in January 1973.

EYES ONLY

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

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RO

14 Dec 72

FORM NO.
1-67

237

Use previous editions

(40)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 17 Dec 1972

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
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REMARKS: <i>R&O discussed w/DCs on 5 Dec 72. Copy sent to C/CO on 6 Dec 72. Copy sent to DDP on 7 Dec 72.</i>		
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FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 65REPLACES FORM 38-8
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(6)

CO0753716

14 DEC 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Computer
SUBJECT: MHC/HAO Survey of [REDACTED]
REFERENCE: Slidum, August-September 1972.

Subject: MHC/HAO Survey of [REDACTED]
: [REDACTED] to Executive
: [REDACTED]

Attached herewith is a cable survey of [REDACTED] Group, Counter-Intelligence Station
analyzed by the Special Operations Bureau, August-September 1972.
This General Survey is a general reference made by the
Survey are referred to as "politics made by the
is of this survey are referred to as "memorandum".

Revised, Special Operations Group
Richard Ober
A/S

Director for Plans
(14 Dec 72)
DDP Review (RQ)
Briefing, 5 Dec 72 (RQ)

Director for Plans
(14 Dec 72)
DDP Review (RQ)
Briefing, 5 Dec 72 (RQ)

Director for Plans
(14 Dec 72)
DDP Review (RQ)
Briefing, 5 Dec 72 (RQ)

SOEC 1972

SUBJECT: NMICHAOS Survey of [REDACTED] Field
Stations, August-September 1972

1. The Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff and [REDACTED] Headquarters conducted a cable survey of [REDACTED] field stations during August and September 1972. The survey was initiated prior to the survey of those stations by the Inspector General but the time span of some of the replies coincided with the IG survey.

2. The following analytical summary of the responses covers the extent of foreign liaison involvement with NMICHAOS requirements, problems involving station liaison with the FBI and any special problems raised by stations regarding the legitimacy/objectives of the NMICHAOS program.

3. Cables to field stations were custom-tailored to each station but all contained the following common background paragraph:

"To insure common basis this review re targetting. Has recapitulating following FYI. Generally, [REDACTED], the bulk of our collection effort involves coverage of selected visitors/travelers for possible direct or indirect linkage with hostile foreign govts/groups/parties/intel services, as means of determining basis existence/extent of foreign exploitation of/involvement in domestic U.S. dissidence/extremism. Info from all appropriate station unilateral assets as well as from liaison is needed. Altho liaison aspect represents occasional duplication with FBI (IPCS or visiting rep, CIA, not FBI), has primary CI responsibility abroad and stations are primary action arm of US Govt in dealing with liaison services on NMICHAOS-related matters. Further, and most important, CIA has responsibility of providing, upon request,

special finished studies/reports, etc., on matters involving MACHAOS. These normally have very short time deadline and must be prepared on basis of immediately available CI info; we cannot rely on timely receipt of such info from foreign liaison via FBI HQs. The number of specially required special [CIA] studies/reports has been increasing, with more to date this year than all of last year."

4.

5.

6.

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7. Only [redacted] stations raised fundamental questions on the NICHAOS program in their replies.

a. [redacted] thought that a redefinition of the scope of the program was needed because of the increasing appearance of U.S. citizens in activities involving the [redacted]

[redacted] has been told that use of NICHAOS channels to report U.S. involvement in such activities is necessary to identify and monitor linkages in foreign efforts abroad to support/encourage/exploit domestic U.S. dissidence.

b. [redacted] commented that it did not wish to call into question the general formulation of CIA responsibility for counter intelligence abroad (cited in paragraph 3 above). It suggested, however, that the Station "continue to exercise its pre-eminent responsibility for CI matters which can be identified with hostile foreign states or institutions...and leave with the FBI, as in the past, concern for the activities at home or abroad which cannot reasonably be associated with such hostile foreign direction."

8. Essentially CIA does exactly what [redacted] suggests above. There is a problem in that field stations often do not know the full background on individuals on whom information is sought regarding their foreign-related contacts and activities while abroad. The bulk of such requirements on CIA originate in the Department of Justice, including the FBI. Some are self-initiated when there is a history of prior contact/involvement with the Chinese Communists and/or Cubans, DRV/PRG representatives, Soviets, North Koreans [redacted]. In all cases the sole purpose of the coverage is to determine if there are foreign linkages and the purpose/objective involved. Negative reporting on the absence of hostile foreign linkages is as important as positive reporting.

9. [redacted] and [redacted] are individuals on whom questions regarding CIA interest have been raised.

The FBI has levied requirements on CIA for information on the MHCHAOS-related activities and contacts of each abroad. [REDACTED] has visited Hanoi and has met with hostile Vietnam. CI/SO [REDACTED] has similarly visited Hanoi.

10. The foreign linkage aspect of the requirements and the foreign locus of the clandestine collection action (unilateral and liaison) constitute the rationale and justification for this particular exercise of the Agency's responsibilities for collection of foreign counterintelligence information. CI/SO, in conjunction with all the CS operating divisions, exercises a continuing scrutiny of its requirements to the field to insure that day-to-day traffic fully reflects paragraph 8 above.

11. An active collection program, however, requires the use of appropriate field personnel on a need-to-know basis determined by each Chief of Station. The mid-1972 [REDACTED] survey reported that [REDACTED] staff employees in [REDACTED] stations (out of a total of about [REDACTED]) were knowledgeable of the MHCHAOS program. A TDY [REDACTED] by the Chief or Deputy Chief of CI/SO to [REDACTED] stations to discuss the program would help clarify any misunderstandings regarding the program; assist in developing future operational efforts; and cover the bulk [REDACTED] of the knowledgeable officers. Stations involved and the numbers of knowledgeable officers in each follow:

[REDACTED]